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NEGLIGENCE;

WIDOW'S

RIGHT

OF ACTION

FOR

HUSBAND'S

Adams v. N. P. R. R., 95 Fed. (Wash.) 938, (1899).
This was an action for damages, brought in the District Court of the
United States, by the widow of a man who had been killed through
DEATH.

the negligence of the defendant company.

The action was based

upon the statute of the State of Washington, of which state deceased was a resident, corresponding to Lord Campbell's Act in
England. At the time of his death, deceased was riding upon a
"pass" which purported to release the defendant from all liability
for injury. The court did not decide whether the deceased could
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sign away his right of action in this way, holding the plaintiff's
right of action to be entirely distinct from that which the deceased
might have had if he had survived. The plaintiff was suing for the loss
of "the support, protection, society-and comfort" of the deceased;
the deceased's action-if he had survived-would have been for
the breach of the implied contract of safe carriage. This right'of
the plaintiff the court held could not be signed away by the deceased; she had been no party to the contract and had not authorized the deceased to act as her agent. Accordingly, judgment was
givenr for the plaintiff.
The view that the widow's right of action is distinct in its nature, is laid down in almost all the courts. The United States
Court adopted this view, in Martn'sAdministratorv. B. 6- 0. R.
R., 1i U. S. 673 (696), decided in 1893 ; also in The Oregon, 73
Fed. 85o (1896). Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Henderson v. P.

R.

R., 51 Pa. 315, (1863), and the majority of

the states have given this interpretation to the statutes. But there
is a great conflict of decisions upon the point, whether the right of
action is entirely separate; that is, can the widow proceed under a
new right and secure damage whether the husband's right was
or was not enforceable? The decision in this case would appear
to give her that right.
The Massachusetts courts make it an entirely independent right
of action, not only enforceable when the husband's right might be
barred: Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R., x62 Mass. 70 (z894); but
allow an action, by the personal representative, to recover damages
suffered by the deceased in his life-time, and an action, for the
benefit of the widow, to proceed at the same time upon these independent grounds and for different purposes.
Bowes v. Boston, 155 Mass. 349 (1892). In that state, there
is a statute providing that "if by reason of the negligence of a
corporation operating a railroad, etc., the life of a passenger is lost,
the corporation shall be punished: Pub. Stat. C. 112, § 212.
Under this act, the court holds this a penalty for a penal offence,
paid to the next of kin instead of to the state: and as such entirely
distinct from any right accruing to the injured party.
The New York rule seems to be that the widow's statutory right
is of so distinct a nature from the injured party's, that she may
maintain an action under the statute after his. death, although he
has previously recovered for assault and battery: Schliching v.
But in a previous case, the court
Win'en, 25 Hun, 626 (88ix).
declared that a widow could not maintain two separate actions as
she can in Massachusetts, because the New York statute did iot
continue the personal action after death.
The English courts seem to hold this doctrine, also: In Leggott
v. G. N. Ry. Co., i Q. B. D. 6oo (1876), it was held that the
widow who has sued under Lord Campbell's Act and recovered,
could, at a later date, bring suit for the benefit of the estate. So
entirely distinct did they consider the two actions that the defend-
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ant company was not estopped from denying matters of fact found
in the previous case.
There is a Kansas case reported (53 Pac. R. 46!, x898), which
exactly agrees with the decision in Adams v. R. R., laying down
the same doctrine of an independent action.
The rule is different in other states. In Indiana, the court holds
that the statue merely continues the common law action; and a
recovery by the injured party is a bar to any subsequent proceeding:
Hecht v. 0. &' Af., 132 Ind. 508 (1892). In Pennsylvania the
court adopts the idea that the cause of action is separate, but the
right never accrues unless (x) the party dies of his injuries, and
(2)
the deceased never commenced any action during his life-time :
The doctrine is that the
Taylor's Estate, 179 Pa. 254 (897).
cause of action merges entirely in the survivor. If he compounds it
or brings a suit to a finish, no further remedy can be had under the
statute. If he commences the suit, and dies before any conclusion,
the statute prevents the suit from abating. If he dies and has
made noattempt to sue, then an entirely "new remedy" springs into
existence by section 19 of the Act of x85i. But, as Green, J., said
in Hilly. P. R. R., 178 Pa. 223 (1896), "it cannot be argued
that it was the intention to give one right of action to the party
injured, and another and independent right of action for the same
injury to the widow." The Act of i855 does not create any new
and independent right, either. It merely extends the number of persons who may sue. The idea that no separate action accrues is laid
down in Taylor'sEstate (supra). There, a guardian was prevented
from suing under the statute, because the deceased had commenced
suit and, after her death, her administrators had made a compromise with the railroad who were the defendant. But there can be
no doubt that the death of the party gives the widow under the
19 th section of the Act of 185!, a new cause of action. In Gross
v. Traction Co., i8o Pa. 99 (1887), the plaintiff married the deceased after his injury was sustained: at the trial, she was allowed
to recover because the cause of action was the death of her husband, not the injury. In conclusion, it may be said, that this doctrine of a separate cause of action is only important in Pennsylvania as giving a new measure for damages, the reasonable expectationof pecuniary advantage: Shuatz v. R. R., ,6o Pa. 6o2 (1894);
but we feel sure that no widow can recover where her husband, had
he survived, could not have recovered.
CORPORATIONS;

ULTRA VIRES; POWER OF A CORPORATION TO

HOLD STOcK IN ANOTHER CORPORATION. It has been recently
decided in the case of the FirstNationalBank of Concord, N . H.,
v. Hawkins (May x5, 1899), rg Supreme Court Reporter (U. S.),
739, that a national bank which purchased and held as an investment certain shares of stock in a second national bank, and received dividends thereon, is not thereby estopped to plead the unlawfulness of its action in defence to a suit by the receiver of the
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second bank after its insolvency to collect an assessment made on
the shareholders by the comptroller. The questions which seem to
be presented by this case are twofold: 3. Can a -corporation acquire and hold the stock of another corporation as an investment?
2. Supposing that it cannot, the question presents itself, can a corporation, having purchased such stock of another corporation, be
estopped to deny its liability as an apparent stockholder after it has
received the benefits accruing from such holding?
The modern English and American doctrines on the first question may be briefly stated, as follows: That a corporation has -no
power to acquire and hold stock in another corporation unless such
power is expressly conferred, or unless the investing in the stock'of
another corporation is contrary to the nature of the business for
which it was created. This rule is well settled and admits of little
or no discussion. In the opinion by Mr. Justice Shiras in this case he
refers briefly to Section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, in which the
powers of a national bank are set forth and among which the power to
hold stock in another national bank, or, in fact, anyother corporation
of any description is not included. In construing this section he
refers to the case of the First National Bank of Charlotte v.
WMational Exchange Bank of Baltimore,

92

U. S.

122

(1875), in

which it was said that "dealing in stocks is not expressly prohibited, but such prohibition is implied from the failure to grant
the power." This interpretation had been previously decided in
this court: Pearce v. Mad. & Ind. R. -R., 21 How. 442 (1858) ;
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 587 (1839) ; Pern'nev. Che.
& Del. Canal Co., 9 How. 184 (1850).
It being admitted, and it is undoubtedly true, that this construction is correct, it naturally follows that the subscription by the
plaintiff bank to the stock of the insolvent bank was prohibited by
the act of incorporation, if not expressly, at least by implication,
and was void. The argument advanced by Boynton, J., in Frankseems
lin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 355 (z88x),
conclusive. He continues, after stating the general rule, as follows: "' Were this not so, one corporation by buying up the majority of the shares of another corporation could take the entire
management of its business, however foreign such business might be
to that which the corporation so purchasing said shares was created
to carry one. A banking corporation could become the operator of
a railroad or carry on the business of manufacturing, and any
other corporation could engage in banking by obtaining control of
the bank's stock." Thus it might be enabled to engage exclusively
in a business entirely foreign to the purposes for which it was
created. It might destroy all competition by destroying its rivals
and wiping them out of existence. On this question the court was
certainly correct in deciding such purchase ultra vires.
The second part of the decision is that a corporation, having
committed such unlawful act and reaped its rewards, can, when
asked to assume a liability which it is only fair it should be pre-
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sumed to have accepted as indispensable to its holding, set up as a
defence to a suit to enforce such liability the ultra vires of its acquisition.
It has been recently decided that, as incidenital to the power to
loan money on personal security, a bank may, in the usual course
of its business, accept stock of another corporation as collateral
security, and by an enforcement of its rights as pledgee it may become the owner of the collateral and be subject to liability as other
stockholders:

Bank v. Kennedy,

x67

U.

S.

362

(1896).

Now if this case be correctly decided it is hard to distinguish between it and the case under discussion. If, as has been said, a
corporation may be held liable when it acquires stock in the usual
course of its business, why should it not be held liable when it acquires it by a voluntary act on its part ? There seems to be no
doubt as to the ultra vires of such act, but should it be allowed to
set this up as a defence when it has reaped for years the fruits of
such illegal act? May a person accept all the profits and escape all
the liabilities for loss? It would seem that such ought not to be
the rule, and this view was taken by Mr. Justice Strong in National
Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628. (z878), in which case he says:
"There is nothing in the argument on behalf of the appellant that
the bank was not authorized to make a loan with the stock of another bank pledged as collateral security. That is an ordinary
mode of loaning, and there is nothing in the letter or spirit of the
National Banking Act that prohibits it. But even if there were,
the lendor could not set up its own violation of the law to escape
the responsibility resulting from its illegal action." This, though
a dictum, was followed in effect in the case of the Citizens' State
Bank v. Hawkins, 71 Fed. 369 (1896).
In Steam Nay. Co. v. Weed, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 378 (x855), the

court, after examining a number of authorities, concludes the opinion
thus: " It ill becomes the defendant to borrow from the plaintiff
for a single day a sum of money to relieve their immediate necessities and then to turn around and say: ' I will not return this money
because you had no power by your charter to loan it.'
So, also, was it held in WHght v. Antwerp Pipe Line, ioi Pa.
(884),
where a corporation, although prohibited by its
charter, entered into a contract for the purchase of stock in another
corporation, and the contract was executed by the delivery of the
stock that it may not plead in defence to a suit on a promissory
note given in payment for the price of the stock, and in the hands
of a purchaser for value, that the contract was ultra vires.
The cases above cited are only a few of many which hold that
the defence of ultra vires by a corporation, which has recovered the
profits of the transaction, is insufficient and will not be supported.
And this view is certainly the more equitable and, in common
justice, the only just conclusion which can be reached, and it is
submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in favor of
the receiver of the insolvent bank was erroneous.
204
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EVIDENCE; ORAL AGREEMENT VARYING CONTRACT OF ENDORSE-

MENT:

Bank of Washington v. Perguson, 59 N.Y. Suppl. This case

is the latest of a long series of decisions upon this question. In
spite of some conflict, the general piinciple seems to be that the con-

tract of endorsement may not be varied by parol. Here Ferguson
was the last endorser upon two promissory notes, drawn by the
Arkell Company, and by it endorsed. The notes were also endorsed by W. J. & J. Arkell. Defendant had the notes discounted
by the plaintiff bank, of which he was vice-president: The proceeds were credited to his use and were utilized by him, part only
being handed to Arkell Company. Ferguson's main defence to
the action was that he was accommodation endorser, and that, at
the time of the endorsement, it was orally agreed that he should
be liable only for the balance of the amount named in the notes
after certain collaterals had been applied and all remedies against
the maker exhausted. In refusing to allow the defence, the court
said: "The defence pleaded is inherently bad. The defendant's
accommodation endorsement was a written contract to which the
law has given a definite character. . . . He now pleads that
the written agreement was not the real agreement. . . . Thus he

distintly seeks to qualify his written obligation. Parol evidence,
tending in this direction, is as clearly inadmissible in a contract of
endorsement, accommodation or otherwise, as in the case of any
other written agreement."
The decision in the Susquehanna Britge Company v. Evans, 4
Wash. (U. S. C. C.), 480 (1829), went the other way in a similar
state of facts. Mr. justice Washington allowed an endorser to show
a parol agreement that the endorsees should charge the maker, on the
ground that "the reasons which forbid the admission of parol evidence to alter or explain written instruments do not apply to those
contracts implied by operation of law, such as that which the law
implies in respect to the endorsement of a note." In Dale v.
Gear, 38 Conn. 486, on the other hand, it was said "the contract
of endorsement is implied by law as clearly and as perfectly from
the blank endorsement of a negotiable note as if written out in
full when endorsed. And if, as between the original parties, there
is any equity existing dehors the instrument, which should prevent
the endorsee from enforcing the contract, it must be set up as an
equity, provable in equity, to bar an apparent legal liability.
. . . And it cannot be shown because the rule of evidence to
which we allude is not applicable."
These statements, though not made with reference to the Susquehanna Bridge case (which was not noticed); are quite applicable,
and clearly show the weakness of Mr. Justice Washington's decision. But that even the Connecticut courts themselves have not
always been consistent on the subject is evident from the early case
of Smith v. Barber, i Rort. ?07, where the court distinctly held
an opinion contrary to the decision in Dale v. Gear.
It seems quite a favorite statement with the text-book writers
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to declare that the law of Pennsylvania especially is anomalous and
out of accord with that of the rest of the country upon this question. They cite various cases in support of their propositions, but
there are three in particular upon which nearly all unite: Hill v.
E , 5 S. & R. 363; Paterson v. Todd, i8 Pa. 426, and Ross v.
Espey, 66 Pa. 48r. Upon a close examination of these cases,
however, they do not lend that degree of support to the statement
which one might reasonably expect from their popularity with those
who cite them.
In Hill v. Ely the defendant purchased coffee of the plaintiff,
giving in payment the notes of a third person upon express agreement that no liability should attach to the defendant. The notes
were handed to plaintiff without endorsement, but he was afterwards induced to endorse the notes, the plaintiff saying he wished
it merely for convenience in collection. The court admitted evidence of this agreement, but only upon the ground that the plaintiff
was guilty of fraud in obtaining or using the endorsement. It was
said that, as this parol evidence would be received in chancery to
reach the fraud, it would also (on account of the constitution of
the Pennsylvania courts) be received in their courts of law. It was
expressly stated that the evidence was not received to contradict
the written agreement.
In Patterson v. Todd a note was endorsed by the payee when
overdue, and the main question was whether there should have been
subsequent demand and notice. The court decided that demand
and notice, within a reasonable time, were necessary. Incidentally,
it not being necessary for the decision of the case, the court said
that the defendant might show, by parol evidence, that he said he
would not warrant the notes. But this was a mere dictum, possibly
thrown off by the court in an unguarded moment. The question
was not directly raised by the facts, nor was it argued by counsel.
And whatever respect we may feel for the court, it is important not
to attach too much weight to chance sayings such as this.
In the third Pennsylvania case, Ross v. Espey, the court allowed
the second endorser in an action against him for the full amount of
the note, by the third endorser, who had paid the note, to show
that there was an agreement between the two endorsers, that in case
of failure by the maker to pay they should be jointly liable. The
facts were almost identical with those in Pilipps v. Preston, 5
Howard, 278, and the decision was the same. But neither of these
cases affirms the proposition that parol evidence is admissible to
vary the endorsement. There was no pretense of grounding the
suit upon the notes or the endorsements upon them. Both actions
were grounded upon the collateral agreement, i. e., that they should
be jointly liable. This was a good parol contract, the consideration
upon each side being the promise emanating from the other side.
The evidence, being offered only to prove this separate parol contract, was of as high a character as the law demands in such cases
and was rightly admitted.
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A few of the principal dissenting cases have been briefly discussed. In affirmance of the principle there are very many cases,
all embodying facts and decisions so nearly identical, that the mention of a few will suffice for all.
Wright v. Morse, 9 Gray, 337. Parol evidence is inadmissible
even between the original parties to a note to show that a person,
whose name is signed upon the back of a note, signed it as guarantor or upon a condition not performed.
Bigelow v. Colon, 13 Gray, 309. One who puts his -name before

delivery on the back of a promissory note, payable to maker -or
order and endorsed by maker, is an endorser and not a joint maker,
and his liability cannot be varied by parol evidence.
Bank of U. S. v. Dunn, 6 Peters, Sr. The defendant was not
allowed to show an agreement that he should not be liable upon his
endorsement.
Specht v. Howard, x6 Wallace, 564. The court.would not
allow evidence of an agreement that .payment should be demanded
in a certain place. It was only through accident that the agreement was not written. But it could not be shown, because it
tended to vary the absolute terms of the written contract.
These are typical of the great number of cases again and again
affirming the point until Parsons feels justified in saying . . .
"it is a firmly-established principle that parol evidence of an oral
agreement alleged to have been made at the time of drawing, making or endorsing a bill or note cannot be permitted to vary,
qualify, contradict, add to or subtract from the absolute terms of
the written contract."

